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Abstract 
 
This paper will examine the impact the last enlargements and treaty change have had on the European Parliament and the 
EU’s system of legislative procedures. The paper assesses the dynamics of the European Parliament in operating according 
to a set of parliamentary functions. The overall question is, how the EP performs in adopting European legislation and in 
controlling the Union’s quasi-executive branches. Do the rules provided by treaties, inter-institutional agreements and 
similar bases matter for the EP as a „multifunctional organization” (Judge/Earnshaw 2003: 24) and how do they matter for 
the repartition of workload within the European Parliament? In analysing the European Parliament’s practice during the past 
1994-1999,  1999-2004,  and  2004-2009  legislatures,  I  propose  to  investigate  the  parliamentary  implementation  of  the 
treaties and treaty amendments. In other terms, I explore the „real use” of the different „constitutional offers” at hand. 
 
Constitutional offers are defined as the EU’s treaty provisions and subsequent inter- and intra-institutional agreements that 
build  on  so-calles  “grey  areas”  of  the  treaties,  a  dynamic  and  evolving  set  of  opportunity  structures  that  provide 
parliamentarians with opportunity structures to participate in the EU’s policy making process. I thus conceive the EU’s 
primary law – the treaties and similar constitutional acts like inter-institutional agreements - as subsequent propositions to 
the EU institutions and the Member States for joint decision making and for delegating powers from one level to another. 
Evidently, the Union’s constitutional bases do not „dictate” a clear nomenclature of procedures, actors to be involved and 
policy fields to be applied (Hofmann 2003). Instead, the institutions have to choose – by application of one or more legal 
bases.  In  other  words,  different  constitutionalised  procedural  blueprints  and  inter-institutional  rules  „compete”  for 
application. 
 
To capture the constitutionally based roles of the European Parliament, I distinguish and trace its different functions. 
Drawing on earlier works by Bourguignon-Wittke et al. (1985), Grabitz et al. (1988), Steppat (1988), Schmuck/Wessels 
(1989) and subsequent studies on the specific role of the European Parliament in a dynamic and evolving structure (Maurer 
1996; Wessels 1996) I define these functions as policy-making, controlling, elective and system-developing (Maurer 2002: 
86-88).  
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1. The European Parliament and institutional reform  
 
One  of  the  key  features  of  the  EU’s  constitutionalisation  process  has  been  the  incremental 
parliamentarisation – i.e. the increased delegation of supervisory, budgetary and legislative powers to 
the European Parliament (EP) – of more and more policy fields since the Single European Act (SEA) 
in 1987. In four Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC' s) – 1985/1987, 1991/1993, 1996/1999, and 
2000 – the EP has seen its own position strengthened.
1 To date, there have only been few attempts to 
understand this process of parliamentarisation.
2  
Proponents of intergovernmentalism argue that the European Union (EU)’s constitutional order “has 
developed  through  a  series  of  celebrated  intergovernmental  bargains”  and  that  “[t]he  most 
fundamental task facing a theoretical account of European Integration is to explain these bargains”.
3 
Viewed in this way, the strengthening of the EP depends solely on member states interests, which are 
negotiated at IGCs. However, both the underlying rationale and the theoretical preponderance of 
IGCs for the constitutional development have increasingly come under attack. On the one hand, it has 
been stressed that on the basis of a rationalist logic of action it is impossible to explain the at least 
partial parliamentarisation of the EU. Indeed, why should governments, which want to maximise 
their national interests, agree to create and empower a supranational parliament, whose powers could 
conflict with their own? On the other hand, it has been argued that IGCs do not act on a “tabula rasa”. 
Instead, existing institutional arrangements and practices of co-operation predetermine the outcomes 
of the negotiation process. Consequently, the EU’s institutional development should not simply be 
seen as isolated, free-standing interstate bargains but rather as continuous process of informal and 
formal Treaty revision, with IGCs often merely formalising existing practices.
4 Looked at this way, 
the process of parliamentarisation takes place through developments which take place between IGCs. 
But how exactly does parliamentarisation between IGCs occur?  
I tackle the puzzle of parliamentarisation by focusing on the role of Interinstitutional Agreements 
(IIAs) within the context of IGC’s. The number of IIAs concluded between the EP, the Commission 
and  the  Council  has  sharply  risen  since  the  Maastricht  Treaty.
5  IIAs  are  designed  to  facilitate 
interinstitutional co-operation and prevent conflicts between the institutions. However, IIAs are more 
than just pragmatic answers to interinstitutional co-operation problems since they tend to strengthen 
the EP’s position in the EU’s constitutional set-up by expanding the EP’s control, information and 
legislative competencies, and placing it on equal footing with the Council.  
 
Arguing about the European Parliament and its potential to provide the European citizens a collective 
voice in the Union’s policy cycles does not mean that parliamentarism and the parliamentarisation of 
the EU’s system (Fischer 2000; Napolitano 2002) is the only way for bridging the gap between the 
citizens  and  the  Union. One  can  easily  assume  that  even  with  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Draft 
Constitutional  Treaty  (DCT,  see:  CIG  86/04),  many  scholars  and  practitioners  of  European 
integration will continue to argue that focusing on the parliamentary input structures of the Union is 
only one of several ways in which governance „beyond the state” (Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch 1996) 
might  gain  legitimacy.  I  therefore  conceive  the  European  Parliament  and  the  cascade-like 
parliamentarisation of the Union’s decision making system (Maurer/Wessels 2001; Maurer 2002) as 
one but an essential tool for building a legitimate European order.  
                                                 
1   On the EP’s system development function see W. Wessels and U. Diedrichs, ‘A New Kind of Legitimacy for a New Kind of Par-
liament:the Evolution of the European Parliament’ (1997) 6, EIOP (http://eiop.or.at); A. Maurer, What next for the European Par-
liament, (London, 1999); A. Maurer and W. Wessels, Das Europäische Parlament nach Amsterdam und Nizza: Akteur, Arena oder 
Alibi? (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2003), R. Corbett/F. Jacobs/M. Shackleton, The European Parliament  (London, 2003). 
2    Cf. S. Hix, ‘Constitutional Agenda-Setting Through Discretion in Rule Interpretation: Why the European Parliament Won at Am-
sterdam’ (2002) 2, British Journal of Political Science, pp. 259-280; B. Rittberger, ‘The Creation and Empowerment of the Euro-
pean Parliament’ 41 JCMS (2003), pp. 203-226. 
3   A. Moravcsik, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community, A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’ 31 JCMS (1993), 
pp. 473-524 at p. 473. 
4   G. Falkner, ‘EU treaty reform as a three-level process’ 9 JEPP (2002), pp. 1-11. 
5   Cf.  for  a  quantitative  overview  W.  Hummer,  ‚Interinstitutionelle  Vereinbarungen  und  “institutionelles  Gleichgewicht”‘  in  W. 
Hummer (ed.), Paradigmenwechsel im Europarecht zur Jahrtausendwende. Ansichten österreichischer Integrationsexperten zu ak-
tuellen Problemlagen. Forschung und Lehre im Europarecht in Österreich (Vienna 2004), pp. 111-180.   3 
 
The EP constitutes one of the four core institutions of the EU. It is the only directly legitimated 
component of the EU’s institutional set-up. The last five treaty reforms caused major implications for 
the European Parliament and its position vis-à-vis the other institutions, specifically the Council and 
the Commission. The DCT confirms Helen Wallace’ analysis that the European Parliament was and 
still is ”the largest net beneficiary of the institutional changes” (Wallace 1996: 63).  
 
This paper first tries to assess the dynamics of the European Parliament in operating according to a set 
of  parliamentary  functions.  The  overall  question  is,  how  the  EP  performs  in  adopting  European 
legislation and in controlling the Union’s quasi-executive branches. Do the rules provided by treaties, 
inter-institutional agreements and similar bases matter for the EP as a „multifunctional organization” 
(Judge/Earnshaw 2003: 24) and how do they matter for the repartition of workload within the European 
Parliament?  
 
In  analysing  the  European  Parliament’s  practice  during  the  past  1994-1999  and  1999-2004 
legislatures,  I  propose  to  investigate  the  parliamentary  implementation  of  the  treaties  and  treaty 
amendments. In other terms, we will explore the „real use” of the different „constitutional offers” at 
hand.  
 
2. Legal Offers and Exploitation. Methodological clarification 
 
I define constitutional offers as the EU’s treaty provisions, a dynamic and evolving set of opportunity 
structures that provide parliamentarians with potential power to participate in the EU’s policy making 
process. I thus conceive the EU’s primary law – the treaties and similar constitutional acts like inter-
institutional agreements - as subsequent propositions to the EU institutions and the Member States 
for joint decision making and for delegating powers from one level to another. Evidently, the Union’s 
constitutional bases do not „dictate” a clear nomenclature of procedures, actors to be involved and 
policy fields to be applied (Hofmann 2003). Instead, the institutions have to choose – by application 
of one or more legal bases - whether an envisaged piece of legislation is subject to parliamentary 
scrutiny through consultation, for EP initiative reports or urgency resolutions, or has to be decided by 
qualified  majority  or  unanimity,  whether  the  legislation  should  be  adopted  in  the  format  of  a 
regulation, a directive or another type, and whether referral should be made to the consultation, the 
co-operation, the assent, or the co-decision procedure or without any participation of the European 
Parliament. In other words, different constitutionalised procedural blueprints and inter-institutional 
rules „compete” for application.  
 
To understand the European Parliament’s development from a merely consultative assembly into a 
more „powerful” legislative chamber, I look at the realization of EU treaty based provisions with 
regard  to  the  day-to-day  utilisation  of  different  legislative  procedures  involving  the  European 
Parliament as an at least consultative body, the exploitation of different policy areas and respective 
legal bases which the treaties provide for adopting binding legislation, the workload of Committees in 
the European Parliament, and the implications of procedures and institutional rules for Parliament’s 
management.  Several  other  developments  illustrate  the  European  Parliament’s  performance  in  the 
implementation of its scrutiny powers, inter alia its original scrutiny powers, the appointment and 
investiture of the European Commission and its role with regard to the nomination of the European 
Central Bank and other institutions, the possibilities to hold the EU’s non-parliamentary institutions to 
account, and the proceedings and findings of the European Parliament’s temporary Committees of 
Inquiry.  
 
To capture the constitutionally based roles of the European Parliament, I distinguish and trace its 
different  functions.  Drawing on earlier works by Bourguignon-Wittke et al. (1985), Grabitz et al. 
(1988), Steppat (1988), Schmuck/Wessels (1989) and subsequent studies on the specific role of the 
European Parliament in a dynamic and evolving structure (Maurer 1996; Wessels 1996) I define these 
functions as policy-making, controlling, elective and system-developing (Maurer 2002: 86-88).     4 
 
o  Policy-making is defined as the participation of the European Parliament in the EC/EU policy 
cycle in relation to the Council and the Commission. The function derives from parliament' s rights 
and obligations to (co-)negotiate and -decide on European politics. The policy-making function 
thus reflects Parliament’s capacity to participate in and to influence the preparation, adoption, 
implementation and control of binding legislative acts.     
o  The control function is defined through Parliament’s rights and obligations to call other institutions 
of the Union to account. In addition to its traditonal role in granting the budgetary discharge to the 
European Commission, the Parliament is involved in other, less spectacular, scrutiny activities. It 
may put oral and written questions to the Commission and the Council, hear Commission officials 
and  national  ministers  in  parliamentary  committees,  hold  public  hearings,  set  up  temporary 
committees of inquiry and discuss the EU’s performance with the Council’s Presidency.  
o  The elective function covers Parliament’s right to participate in the nomination and investiture of 
other EU institutions (the Commission, to appoint a European Ombudsman or Mediator. Thus, as 
studies previously carried out on the European Parliament considered the elective function only to a 
limited extent, this function has since been significantly developed.  
o  Finally, the system-development function refers to the participation of the European Parliament in 
the development of the EU' s constitutional system (such as institutional reforms and the division of 
competencies).  Making  full  use  of  this  function  also  relies  on  instruments  such  as  the  use  of 
internally binding law such as the Rules of Procedure. Thus, the system-development function refers 
to Parliament’s ability to present, promote and defend proposals for institutional reform. 
 
Time is a scarce ressource. Different issues, agendas, parliamentary functions and roles compete for 
attention and define the relative, daily importance of EP functions and MEP’s profiles. Given the limits 
on time and ressources of parliamentarians, the definition of certain priorities necessarily leads to other 
points on the agenda being treated as secondary. Hence, the European Parliament, its Committees and 
its individual MEP’s have to manage the allocation of their ressources in order to fulfil the treaty-based 
duties according to a rather rigid time-schedule. Each new EU treaty does not only bring new powers to 
the EP, but induces a revision of parliamentary tasks and functions in the light of time as a fixed 
constraint. To put it bluntly: During the 1970’s, the EP could easily allow each individual member to 
act as freely as possible, because the EU’s constitutional framework did not force the EP to deliver 
legislative amendments within a given time-period. The introduction of the cooperation, the assent, and 
later  on  the  codecision  procedure  thus  terminated  the  EP’s  relative  independence  from  the 
Commission’s  and  the  Council’s  work  programme.  The  substance  of  the  policy-making  function 
altered considerably and forced the EP to reallocate the time-schedule of its plenary and committee 
sessions in order to digest incoming – legislative - workload. Parliamentary efficiency became one of 
the favourite jingles of the EP. Kreppel’s analysis on the evolution of the EP’s rules of procedure 
underlines  rightly  that  the  „most  frequently  cited  reason  for  a  adopting  a  change,  and  often 
controversial  changes  were  proposed  in  the  name  of  greater  efficiency”  (Kreppel  2002,  104). 
Consequently, giving priority to a set of duties and resulting functions defines the set of duties to be 
treated as secondary issues and moves other parliamentary functions on the political backburner.  
 
 
3. The evolution of the European Parliament’s roles   
 
As  the  Luxembourg,  Maastricht,  Amsterdam  and  Nice  versions  of  the  EU  treaties,  the  DCT 
considerably alters the institutional balance between the Union’s main actors (Huber 2003: 574-599; 
Jacobs 2003; Nickel 2003: 501-509; Scelo 2002: 578-582; Schoo 2004: 63-74). The Treaty will have 
a major impact on the EP by increasing its formal powers in different ways. The extension of the 
areas where the co-decision and the assent procedure apply, the simplification of the co-decision 
procedure, the full recognition of Parliament within the field of home and judicial affairs, and the 
changes made to the procedure for the nomination of the President of the Commission and the other 
Commissioners.  
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The DCT’s reforms are constitutional follow-ups and adjustments to the Maastricht Treaty, and not a 
totally new conceptualisation of the Union’s para-constitutional basis. Therefore, and in order to 
accelerate ideas about how the Parliament may develop in the next years, we should go one step 
below primary law and look into the exploitation of what has already been achieved. The DCT 
reveals a tendency towards a multi-level polity where competencies are not only shared between the 
Members  of  the  Council  but  also  between  the  Council  and  the  EP.  In  a  retrospective  view, 
Parliament’s access to the decision-making system of the EC is the result of a slow but unrelenting 
process  of  Treaty  reforms.  Hence,  the  relative  proportion  of  Parliament’s  exclusion  from  the 
European policy-making process has diminished considerably. However, if we focus on the absolute 
rates  of  the  treaty-based  decision-making  procedures,  we  have  to  recognise  that  the  growth  in 
consultation, co-operation and co-decision procedures has been offset by an incessant increase in 
Parliament’s ‘non-participation’.  
 
Graph 1: Decision Making powers of the EP and the Council (absolute numbers) 
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Graph 2: Decision Making powers of the EP and the Council (relative, in per cent) 
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The Treaty reforms introduced and subsequently widened the scope of application of the co-decision 
procedure both with respect to those policy areas which it had just introduced into the EC sphere and 
with respect to policy areas already covered by the co-operation procedure. The assent procedure was 
extended to new TEU provisions such as sanctions in the event of a serious and persistent breach of 
fundamental rights by a Member State. The IGC’s from Luxembourg (1986) to Nice (2000) also 
confirmed a constant extension of consultation procedures for new policy areas such as in the field of 
home and judicial affairs, social and employment policy. The Convention, and the introduction of a 
hierarchy  of  norms  and  procedures  (Articles  I-32  to  I-36  DCT)  then  resulted  in  a  reduction  of 
consultation and a switch from consultation to codecision. As a result of the last IGC processes, 
many core issues of European integration had been added to decision-making procedures providing 
the  European  Parliament  with  considerable  powers  vis-à-vis  the  Council  of  Ministers  and  the 
European Commission. However, the European Parliament continues to be excluded from dynamic 
and „costly” policy areas such tax harmonization (Article 93 ECT) and trade policy (Article 133 
ECT).  
 
Apart  form  the  extension  of  co-decision,  the  Amsterdam  Treaty  simplified  the  procedure  itself 
considerably in four ways: It provides for the adoption of a legislative text at first reading phase if the 
European Parliament does not propose any amendment at first reading or if the Council agrees with 
all of the European Parliament’s first reading amendments. Second, the phase whereby the European 
Parliament could vote on its intention to reject the Council’s common position was dropped – mainly 
on the basis of the EP’s own attempts during the IGC. Consequently, the European Parliament can go 
straight to a vote of rejection and the draft proposal will fail. Third, the so-called third reading 
whereby the Council could seek to impose the common position after a breakdown of conciliation, 
unless  the  European  Parliament  could  overrule  it  by  an  absolute  majority  of  its  members,  was 
dropped, too. The elimination of the third reading was the most controversial question. In the end, 
France accepted the new procedure for two reasons: First, Paris’ proposals for strengthening the role 
of national parliaments in the Union were successful in that Amsterdam provided for a new, legal-
binding protocol on the powers offered to these actors (Maurer 2001). Secondly, unlike its then 
Gaullist predecessor, not only the French Socialist Party as such, but also the Red-Green coalition 
lead by Lionel Jospin had a more positive attitude towards the European Parliament. Fourth, as one 
of the most important achievements of Amsterdam, the procedure provided for the proposal to have 
failed in the absence of agreement in conciliation. This deletion of the third-reading phase finally put 
Parliament on an equal footing with the Council in every stage of the procedure. Under the original 
co-decision procedure, the Council could obstruct Parliament with a „take-it-or-leave-it” offer after 
unsuccessful conciliation (Tsebilis 1994; Garrett 1995; Tsebelis & Garrett 1997). The „equalisation” 
of both legislative branches thus induced a more balanced set of veto powers. In more concrete terms, 
Codecision II (post-Amsterdam) had important effects for how the Parliament is perceived by the 
outside world: Under the Maastricht rules, the Council could easily make the Parliament pay for the 
failure  of  a  draft  legislative  act.  Since  the  entry  into  force  of  Amsterdam,  both  Council  and 
Parliament share the responsibility for the adoption as well as the failure of a proposed legislative act. 
Both institutions anticipated this reform in March 1998, when no agreement on the Comitology issue 
could be found within the conciliation committee on the draft directives 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC. 
Instead  of  revising  the  draft  according  to  the  Maastricht  Treaty  provisions,  the  two  institutions 
declared the failure of the procedure after conciliation. 
 
4. Exploitation I - Parliamentary Co-Governance in practice 
 
Both  the  co-operation  and  the  co-decision  procedure  had  a  considerable  impact  on  the  EP’s 
involvement in the production of binding EC legislation (Crombez 1997, Crombez 2000). Until July 
2004 a total of 759 legislative proposals had been transmitted to the EP pursuant to the co-decision 
procedure, of which 630 had been concluded. In 559 cases the Commission’s initiatives resulted in 
binding  legislation  decided  jointly  by  the  EP  and  the  Council.  71  legislative  proposals  of  the 
Commission failed. In 63 of these, the procedure lapsed because the Council was unable to adopt a 
common position and the Commission decided to withdraw its original proposal. Only eight cases   7 
failed  due  to  unsuccessful  conciliation  (four  times)  or  after  the  EP  voted  against  the  agreement 
reached  in  the  conciliation  committee  (four  times).  Apart  from  these  failures,  the  co-decision 
procedure has led to satisfactory outcomes.
1 
 
Since 1996 nearly one quarter of EC legislation considered by the EP was adopted under the co-
decision procedure. The last three versions of the EU Treaties strengthened the position and legislative 
role  of  Parliament  regarding  the  internal  market,  including  the  areas  of  environment,  consumer 
protection,  transport,  research  and  education  policy.  Moreover,  taking  into  account  the  total  of 
legislation  passed  since  1986/87  by  adding  together  the  percentages  of  both  co-operation  and  co-
decision, their scope of application within Parliament had been significantly extended. However, if we 
take into account the overall output of binding legislation adopted either by the Council of Ministers or 
by the EP jointly with the Council, we should qualify this assessment: Hence, legislative acts concluded 
in 2003 pursuant to both the co-operation and co-decision procedure represented only 39,3 % of the 
total of legislation adopted by the Council. But before jumping on conclusions highlighting the relative 
failure of Parliament as a ‘truely’ legislative chamber, we should take a closer look into the proportion 
between the Council’s legislation and Parliament’s involvement therein:  
 
The overall EU legislative output is mainly due to three policy fields: Agriculture and Fisheries, Trade 
policy and Customs policy. Note also the high percentage of Commission legislation - authorised either 
by the Treaty itself or the Council pursuant to its right to delegate executive competencies to the 
Commission - in agriculture policy. In turn, the policy fields dealing with Socio-Economics represent 
only 15 to 25 % of the EC’s production in binding law. If we concentrate on these fields which 
comprise  the  internal  market,  industry,  economic  policy,  environment  and  consumer  protection, 
telecommunication  and  transport  policy,  the  EP’s  legislative  role  becomes  much  more  significant: 
Since  most  of  the  legislation  in  these  fields  required  either  for  co-operation  or  co-decision,  the 
participation  of  Parliament  tends  towards  75  %.  Hence  a  high  proportion  of  the  Council’s  output 
concerns non-legislative acts, i.e. executive or administrative acts, especially in the fields of agriculture, 
competition, trade and customs policy. Neither the EP as such nor any of its component political groups 
asked to participate in consultation or any other procedural rule when the Council deals as a price-
fixing agency or when it confirms Member State nominations for one of its standing committees. If one 
concentrates exclusively on the Council’s output in the fields of environment or consumer protection 
policy, the EP’s participation through co-operation and co-decision is much more significant (in 2003 
around 82%).  
 
45,69 % of the codecision procedures concluded up to the end of July 1999 were based on Article 95 
(harmonisation  measures  concerning  the  internal  market).  For  the  1999-2004  legislature,  the 
exploitation of Article 95 deminished towards 26 %, while the use of the legal bases for environment, 
health,  social  and  transport  policy  augmented  considerably,  thus  mirroring  both  the  EP’s  new 
legislative powers and the increased importance attached to these policy fields. 
 
If we take a closer look at the „internal market” measures passed under co-decision, we identify 
nearly 80% of acts which were related to environmental and consumer protection policy. Being of a 
regulatory nature (definition of norms, restrictions, limits etc.), the EU institutions based legislation 
on the general harmonisation clause Article 95 provides for. During the 1999-2004 legislature, 51 % 
of  the  co-decision  procedures  were  based  on  ‘new’  policy  competencies  incorporated  into  the 
Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties together with the co-decision procedure (Education and Youth, 
Culture, Health, Consumer Protection, Trans European Networks, Data protection). On the other 
hand, the exploitation of legal bases dealing with Title III ECT on the free movement of persons, 
services and capital was less significant: 7,8 % of all co-decision procedures were based on one of 
these articles.  
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Graph 3: Eploitation of Legal Bases in Codecision 1994-2006 
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Author’s own calculation on the basis of the Legislative Observatory; Legend: Art. 40 – Free movement of workers; Art. 44 – Right of 
establishment; Art. 46 – Treatment of foreign nationals; Art. 47 – Mutual recognition of diplomas and provisions for the self-employed; Art. 55 
– Services; Art. 71 – Transport policy; Art. 80 – Transport policy; Art. 95 – Internal market harmonisation; Art. 137/138/141 – Social policy; 
Art. 149 – Education and Youth; Art. 150 – Vocational training; Art. 151 – Culture; Art. 152 – Incentive measures for public health; Art. 156 – 
Trans-European  Network  guidelines;  Art.  166-173  –  Multi-annual  Framework  Programme  for  Research  &  Technology;  Art.  175  – 
Environment programmes; Art. 179 – Development policy; Art. 284 -  Information policy; Art. 285-286: Statistics and Data Protection. 
 
 
The increased referall to the co-decision procedure has extensive effects on the functioning and the 
internal management of the EP (Shackleton 2000, Maurer 2002). Given the time-constraints imposed 
on the Parliament by the procedure and the concentration of its scope of application, Parliament had 
to adapt itself in several ways.  
 
Similarly to what we can observe with regard to the scope of the procedure, co-decision is leading to 
a structural concentration of workload in three permanent committees. Hence, the bulk of procedures 
during  the  1994-1999  period  touched  the  Committee  on  the  Environment,  Public  Health  and 
Consumer Protection, the Committee on Economics and the Committee on Legal Affairs. During the 
1999-2004 period, the Committee on Regional Policy and Transport and the Committee on Trade, 
Industry, Energy and Research Policy entered into the Club of the busiest legislative Committees.  
The procedure proved to be very time-consuming for MEP’s in those committees with a heavy co-
decision burden. The five committees concerned shared nearly 80,1 % of all procedures concluded 
until July 2004.  
 
The Committees on Agriculture, on Fisheries and on Civil Liberties were activitated by a relatively 
high amount of legislative consultation procedures. The Committee on Foreign Affairs digested the 
highest  amount  of  Assent  procedures,  and  the  two  budgetary  committees  focused  on  both 
consultation and budgetary procedures. Only the Committees on Employment and Social Affairs, on 
Constitutional  Affairs,  and  on  Women’s  Rights  and  Equal  Opportunities  dealt  merely  with  EU 
legislation.  
 
   9 
Graph 4: Exploitation of EP Committees in Codecision 1994-2006 
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Table 1: Overall Eploitation of Codecision, Consultation and Assent procedures within the EP 
Committees 1994-2004 
 
  AGR
I 
PECH 
LIB
E 
CUL
T 
ECO
N 
EMP
L 
ITR
E   
ENV
I 
JUR
I 
AFE
T 
RET
T 
FEM
M 
DEV
E 
BUD
G 
CON
T 
AFCO 
COD   15  10  33  71  20  50  175  73  2  78  5  12  12  2 
CON   571  145  39  114  96  231  96  69  26  23  5  22  113  3 
Assen
t  
2  0  0  0  0  34  0  4  47  3  0  4  1  2 
Sum  588  155  72  185  116  315  271  146  75  104  10  38  126  7 
Author’s own calculation on the basis of the Legislative Observatory 
 
Obviously,  the  extension  of  co-decision  confirms  the  ongoing  dynamics  of  organisational 
concentration  and  functional  differentiation-specialisation  within  the  EP  (Bowler/Farrell  1995, 
Farrell/Héritier 2003). The rearrangement of Parliament’s Committee structure of April 1999 boosted 
these features to some extent. Both the new Committee on Legal affairs and the Internal Market 
(JURI) and the Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy (ITRE) took over the 
tasks related to co-decision of the former three Committees: Economic and Monetary Affairs and 
Industrial  Policy;  Research,  Technological  Development  and  Energy;  Legal  Affairs  and  Citizen 
Rights.  Therefore,  concentration  remained  within  the  family  of  former  ‘legislative’  Committees. 
More challenging the new Committee on Regional Policy, Transport and Tourism (RETT) fused two 
Committee  structures,  which  heretofore  fulfilled  fairly  different  tasks:  Whereas  the  bygone 
Committee on Regional policy concentrated on a consultative role in distributive policy making, the 
former Transport and Tourism Committee acted under consultation, co-operation and co-decision and 
was  involved  in  both  the  generation  of  some  kind  of  ‘European  public  goods’  (Trans-European 
Networks)  and  regulatory  policy  making.  Therefore,  the  fused  Committee  on  Regional  Policy, 
Transport  and  Tourism  developed  a  structure  providing  rather  new  cross-sectional  views  of   10 
Parliament. Since the Council retained its sectional structure for regional and structural policy on the 
one hand and transport policy on the other until 1999, the Members of the Parliament’s cross-cutting 
Committee  provided  a  more  comprehensive  perspective  into  the  fragmented  „policies-actors” 
structure of the Council, COREPER and the related working group network.  
 
5. Does Parliament matter?  
 
Through  the  introduction  and  subsequent  reform  of  the  co-decision  procedure,  the  European 
Parliament gained more control in the legislative process (- it can prevent the adoption of legislation -
) and acquired more means of input into binding EC legislation (- the final legislative act requires 
Parliament’s  explicit  approval  -).  Co-decision  had  a  considerable  impact  on  the  „functional 
professionalisation”  and  policy  field  linked  ”specialisation”  of  MEP’s.  Hence,  the  nature  of  EU 
legislation under codecision condemns Members to become experts in highly technical and complex 
issues. Expertise is not a new feature for MEP’s, and it is not exclusively relevant to the existence of 
the co-decision procedure. However, unlike other procedures, co-decision provides much more room 
for manoeuvre, where Parliament and Council are obliged to settle technical issues of an immediate 
relevance for the EU’s citizenry, face to face, and on an equal footing. If Parliament amends the 
Council’s common position and the latter is not willing to accept the amended version, Parliament 
has the power to bargain with the Council on a joint compromise text. However, procedures and 
inter-institutional rules are not what the electorate is primarily interested in. Citizens do not vote on 
the ground of highly aggregated institutional settings, nor do they vote for an institution as a unitary 
body among other at the disposal. Instead electing the EP means selecting those which reflect the 
citizenry wishes, interests, worries and concerns. Elections are about people, parties and cleavages 
(Hix 2001). Neither are the media interested in providing an account of how substance is being 
achieved. Public(hed) Opinion too is oriented to daily or weekly news on who has ruled out whom, 
who is paying for what, who has achieved substance. In this context, MEP’s are in an uncomfortable 
situation. The bulk of achievements is reached with overwhelming majorities, leaving apart the fact 
that Parliament is composed by political groups. Thus, the usual confrontation between ‘left’ and 
‘right’ does not appear in the public realm. The net which frames deliberation and decision-making 
processes in the Union is highly complex. Since the lines of confrontation are inter-institutional 
instead of partisanship, they tend to de-politicise conflicts and substance. 
 
Given that the expansion in formal powers implies MEP’s with a heavier burden of responsibility, 
they have to ensure that the culminated interests  of the EU’s citizenry are taken seriously. One 
possibility  to  ‘measure’  the  influence  of  Parliament  is  to  analyse  the  track  of  parliamentary 
amendments  and  to  compare  the  success-rates  of  co-decision  with  those  of  co-operation  or 
consultation. The empirical evidence about the EP’s relative success at different stages and readings 
of  the  procedures  (Maurer  1998:  42,  partly  reproduced  in  Hix  1999:  97)  does  not  confirm  the 
prediction by Tsebelis and Garrett (Tsebelis/Garrett 1997: 74-92) who argued that the introduction of 
codecision reduced the power of the EP (on the criticism against Tsebelis and Garrett see: Moser 
1996: 56-62, Scully 1997: 233-252, Scully 1997a: 58-73, Scully 1997b: 93-103). Of the 86 joint texts 
agreed in conciliation during the 1999-2004 period, 17 % corresponded to the Council’s Common 
position, 23 % were closer to the EP’s amendments adopted at its second reading, and 60 % were 
genuine joint texts with EP amendments partly integrated into the final text (European Parliament 2004: 
14).   
 
The EP does not simply propose amendments, but it approves the draft legislative texts at every stage 
of the procedure ”with Parliament’s amendments”. Consequently, Parliament acts as a joint author 
alongside the Council or – with regard to the first reading stage – the Commission during all phases of 
codecision. Thus, a second way of measuring the degree of influence which Parliament exerts on the 
substance of a legislative act dealt with under the co-decision procedure is to compare the final texts 
with the different drafts prepared by the Council and/or the European Parliament. One can distinguish 
between four cases:    11 
·  a final act corresponding to the Parliament’s first reading which is defined as an act where the 
Council approves the EP’s first reading draft without amending it;  
·  a final act corresponding to the Parliament’s second reading which is defined as an act where the 
Council approves the EP’s second reading draft without amending it;  
·  a final act corresponding to the Council’s common position which is defined as an act where the 
European  Parliament,  in  its  second  reading  approves  the  Council’s  common  position  without 
amending it;  
·  a final act corresponding to the conciliation committee’s joint compromise text which is defined as 
an act where the Council was not able to take over all parliamentary second reading amendments. 
In this case, conciliation becomes necessary and both the Parliament and Council produce a joint 
text subject to a third reading in both institutions. 
 
During the 1994-1999 legislature, 73 successful pieces of legislation corresponded to the Council’s 
common position, while only 31 were based on the EP’s second reading and 63 cases on the joint 
compromise text agreed between Parliament and Council at third reading stage. During the 1999-2004 
legislature, 118 legal acts were adopted on the basis of the EP’s first reading, while 91 grounded on the 
Council’s  common  position,  93  on  Parliament’s  second  reading  and  86  on  the  joint  compromise 
between the two institutions.  
 
However, we should not jump to conclusions in interpreting these figures as a failure of the EP’s 
influence. Firstly, even a legislative act which corresponds to the Council’s common position is an act 
concluded  with  Parliament’s  agreement.  Secondly,  a  legislative  act  corresponding  to  the  common 
position of the Council does not automatically represent a legislative act where Parliament had any 
influence.  Hence,  the  Council  in  its  common  position  incorporates  parliamentary  first  reading 
amendments and consequently, the Parliament does not propose new amendments in the second reading 
stage (Hubschmid/Moser 1997).  
 
6. Exploitation II - More legislation does not increase parliamentary scrutiny 
  
Does the increase of Parliament’s workload with regard to its policy-making function induces a 
change in attention of its control function? Accountability is a key concept of western democracies. It 
„can be seen as a precondition for other components of democratic rule: it is political responsibility 
that ensures that the terms on which political power is authorised are duly observed; and it is the need 
for power-holders to compete for re-election that gives them an incentive to be responsive to the 
public” (Lord 1998: 80). The EP’s traditional instruments for holding other institutions to account - 
parliamentary questions – are oriented towards the single MEP and political groups. Questions are one 
of the ”freest procedures in modern legislatures”. They „give the individual MEP an excellent chance of 
promoting and defending those issues which he or she regards important” (Raunio 1996: 357). In other 
terms, questions also serve MEP’s to present or to defend their perceived constituency’s interest. Given 
the observed characteristics of a legislative and specialist parliament with regard to its policy-making 
function, questions can be regarded as a compensatory element for the individual and, with regard to 
the profile of MEP’s, for the backbencher.  
 
Due to the anticipated position and workload in EC legislation and thus to the expected restrictions on 
available plenary time, Parliament changed its internal rules already in 1993 to re-organise its working 
mechanisms for executing its control function. Since then three kinds of questions are allowed: Written 
questions tabled by any MEP are the most popular of the procedures, since there are no procedural 
constraints and Members are free to decide when to submit a written question. Questions for oral 
answer  (with  debate)  can  only  be  tabled  by  a  committee,  a  Political  group  or  32  MEP’s.  These 
questions are filtered by the Conference of Presidents which decide on their admissibility and order. 
The reply to these questions may be followed by the adoption of a resolution. Again, only a Committee, 
a Political group or 32 MEP’s may table such a resolution. Finally, questions in question-time can be 
tabled by any MEP but the President decides on their admissibility and on the order.    12 
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Author’s own calculation on the basis of the Annual reports of the European Commission. 
 
The oscillation of all three types of questions during a parliamentary term does not follow a clear 
pattern except that of direct elections. MEP’s increase the frequency with which they table questions 
prior to direct elections. However, since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the two types of 
oral  question  have  remained  at  a  level  of  around  1000  and  250  respectively  per  year.  Moreover, 
questions for oral answer are at a very low level and – given the increase in number of MEP’s since 
1995 (626 in relation to 518 since 1986) - clearly in decline. In contrast, it seems that written questions 
enjoy a growing interest among MEP’s. As regards the destination of questions since November 1993, 
we observe a slight but constant growth in questions to the Council of Ministers. This interest in the 
Council started to increase in the early 90’s, and remain stable since the coming into force of the 
Maastricht Treaty. Consequently, the newly introduced types of question with regard to the second and 
third pillars have not had a significant impact on the operation of Parliament’s questions. Overall, the 
most  original  instrument  of  the  European  Parliament' s  control  vis-à-vis  the  Commission  and  the 
Council has lost its attractiveness.  
 
Another possibility for scrutiny exists in article 193 ECT providing for the European Parliament to set 
up  temporary  Committees  of  Inquiry  in  order  to  investigate  ”alleged  contraventions  or 
maladministration in the implementation of Community law”. Parliament started its first inquiry at the 
beginning of 1996 with an examination of the EC’s transit system.
2 In July 1996, the EP decided then to 
set up a second Committee on the BSE crisis which met 31 times during 6 months and presented its 
report in February 1997 (Shackleton 1997). The two committees of inquiry were successful in various 
ways. In spite of the lack of a judicial sanction mechanism in order to oblige witnesses to tell the truth, 
the two committees recorded the evidence and made it available to the general public. In doing so, the 
EP  ensured  that  witnesses  would  be  held  to  account  by  a  wide  audience  outside  the  Parliament. 
Especially  the  BSE  committee  encouraged  and  enjoyed  a  significant  press  and  media  coverage 
(Shackleton 1997: 11).  
 
Due to a conditional threat of a possible motion of censure (Lord 1998), there was a direct and visible 
impact of the committees’ work on the investigated institutions, namely the European Commission. In 
its resolution of 19 February 1997, Parliament warned the Commission, that if the recommendations of 
the BSE committee were not carried out within a reasonable deadline and in any event by November 
1997, a motion of censure would be tabled. The threat of voting a motion of censure was a novelty for 
the  European  Union.  It  showed  how  the  right  of  inquiry  can  be  combined  with  other  powers  at 
Parliament’s  disposal.  And  Parliament’s  work  mattered:  Within  the  European  Commission,  the 
responsibilities of the Directorate General responsible for Consumer Affairs were widely expanded. In 
turn, the prestigious, but highly criticised DG for Agriculture was obliged to hand over seven scientific, 
veterinary and food committees as well as a special unit which evaluates public health risks. Most   13 
important perhaps, the BSE inquiry also had a considerable impact on the outcome of the 1996/1997 
IGC. It lead to a fundamental change of the legal basis for EC legislation in the field of veterinary 
medicine. Article 152.4b ECT as amended by the Amsterdam Treaty held that ”by way of derogation 
from Article 37, measures in the veterinary and phytosanitary fields which have as their direct objective 
the protection of public health”, are to be decided pursuant to the co-decision procedure! The two 
committees of inquiry proved to be an effective additional means for the European Parliament’s 
supervisory powers. The European Parliament demonstrated ”its traditional pugnacious assertiveness 
of its rights and its ingenuity in exploiting constitutional grey areas” (Westlake 1997: 23). Article 6 
of the Interinstitutional agreement holds that the rules ”may be revised as from the end of the current 
term of the European Parliament in the light of experience”. Given the two ”test-cases” of the BSE- 
and the Transit-Committee, future negotiations between the institutions may focus on a sanction 
mechanism for Member States that refuse to co-operate in an inquiry. However, given the Council’s 
–  i.e.  the  Member  States’  –  reluctance  during  the  original  negotiations  on  the  agreement,  the 
Parliament is not likely to gain additional powers.  
 
7. Exploitation III - More legislation equals less individualised MEP work 
 
Own initiative and urgency resolutions are an indicator for measuring the interest of MEP’s in using 
different non-legislative scrutiny instruments offered to the EP. Initiative reports and resolutions 
reflect awareness and interest of individual MEP’s in making an issue public to the outside world – 
towards the Union’s citizenry but also towards the Council and the Commission. Given the historical 
lacks  of  parliamentary  powers  in  relation  to  participation  in  binding  EC  legislation,  MEP’s  and 
political groups referred to the opportunity of own initiatives or urgency resolutions to give evidence 
of their general interests, their attention paid to a given issue or of their willingness to shape the 
policy agenda. For political groups, initiative resolutions are one of the core instruments which allow 
them to present their original point of view on a given issue. Even if own initiatives do not result in 
the adoption of new regulatory or distributive legislation, they allow MEP’s and political groups to 
make prove of their collective – denationalised – interest in EU politics. Hence, in contrast to co-
decision, where action against the Council (amendments to or rejection of its common position) 
requires the approval of an absolute majority (during the 1999-2004 legislature at least 314 votes), 
own initiative resolutions pass with the simple majority of votes cast. Accordingly, whereas co-
decision  condemns  the  two  major  political  groups  –  the  Party  of  European  Socialists  and  the 
European Peoples Party – to reach agreement on parliamentary amendments which in consequence 
move the left-right cleavage apart from the agenda, own initiatives and similar resolutions provide 
each political group the opportunity to present their original socio-economic argument before the 
public. A major consequence of the shift towards EP legislative power and its effective execution is a 
strong  decrease  in  the  number  of  non-legislative  resolutions,  own  initiative  reports  (inviting  the 
Commission  to  forward  legislative  initiatives)  and  resolutions  after  statements  or  urgencies.  The 
number of these activities fell sharply from 2,41 per MEP in 1979 to 0,15 per MEP in 2003! On the 
other  hand,  the  longer  trend  of  this  parliamentary  function  reflects  the  impact  of  the  2004 
enlargement.  Hence,  the  ratio  of  initiative  reports  per  MEP  is  increasing  since  that  date,  thus 
reflecting the concentration of new MEP from the CEEC towards this kind of policy control. 
   14 
Graph 6: Initiative Reports and Urgency Resolutions 1979-2006 
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
Years
A
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
 
N
o
s
.
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
N
o
s
.
 
p
e
r
 
M
E
P
Own Initiatives and Urgency
Resolutions
Initiatives and Urgencies per
MEP
 
Author’s own calculation on the basis of the Annual reports of the European Commission. 
 
Graph 6 shows the evolution of parliamentary initiative and urgency resolutions between 1979 and 
2006. What becomes observable is that the evolution of the total number of initiatives and urgencies 
correlate with the constitutional setting and development of the Community/Union over time. In this 
regard, the growth from 1984 to 1986 reflects Parliament’s activity in relation to European Political 
Co-operation and – more important – to its attempts for moving the then EEC into a European Union. 
The introduction of the co-operation and the assent procedure (Single European Act) then resulted in 
a continuous decrease of own initiatives. Only the debates on the Maastricht Treaty reversed this 
trend. However, since the entry into force of Maastricht, the usage of initiatives is falling again 
continueously and dramatically. Moreover, if we take into account the growth of Parliament due to 
the enlargement of the Union towards Spain, Portugal in 1985 and Finland, Sweden and Austria in 
1995, we observe a significant decrease in resolutions per MEP from 1984 to 1985 and from 1994 to 
1995 respectively. In other terms: The growth in number of MEP’s did not result in an increase of 
non-legislative activity of Parliament.  
 
8. The European Parliament’s Communication Deficit 
 
Since  1993/1994  the  codecision  procedure  has  been  implemented  extensively.  Clear  focuses  are 
observable in the areas of the internal market policy, environmental policy and parts of the EU’s 
socio-economic agenda. The empirical analysis point to a specific process of EU-parliamentarisation 
in these policy areas. On the other hand, the exploitation of the EP’s policy-making function induced 
a  specialisation  of  MEP’s  and  a  segmentation  of  the  EP  into  legislative  and  non-legislative 
Committees. MEP’s active in policy-making become expert specialists in complicated matters. They 
present expertise and counterexpert' s assessments to the Council’s and the Commission’s actors and 
argue about their political relevance and penetration into binding legislation. Indeed this potential is 
also  given  by  the  consultation  procedure.  However,  providing  and  battling  for  expertise  and 
counterexpert’s assessments was barely used due to the ineffectiveness of parliamentary amendments 
in this procedure.  
 
Overall, the institutional ‘infinalité’ of the EU treaties helped the EP to strengthen its potential of 
influence because it did not have to integrate itself into the stiff corset of a representative' s chamber 
whose majority is obliged to the loyalty to the Commission or the Council. Differently: Just the 
absence of an institutional hierarchy otherwise usual in the EU member states between government 
and  parliament  permitted  the  EP  to  adapt  its  potential  as  a  co-legislating  and  power-limiting   15 
institution. The inclusion of the EP into the EU’s legislative procedures had no negative effects on 
the efficiency of the whole decision making system. On the contrary: The power extensions of the EP 
in its policy-making function led all together to more efficient decision-making sequences, although 
the potential for interinstitutional conflict has increased between Council and EP (Maurer 2003: 239-
241).  
 
The increase of formal legislative powers of the EP induced a considerable shift of emphasis from the 
control function to the policy-making function, because policy-making claims more and more time 
and  personnel  resources.  Under  this  point  of  view  the  investigation  could  prove  that  the 
parliamentary calender downgrades the more original functions of the EP in the area of its control-
function through questions, own initiative and urgency resolutions. Consequently, the possibilities of 
MEP’s for mediating citizens’ or constituency concerns are significantly reduced. This development 
should be considered as but one important reason for the low attraction of the EP with the EU’s 
citizens. The policy-making function is not evolving as an incentive for the EU citizens to vote for 
the  EP,  because  the  possibility  of  party  political  aggregation  of  voter' s  interests  within  the  EP 
remains complicated just in those phases of the EU’s decision-making processes in which the EP can 
exercise its power vis-à-vis the Council.  
 
The biggest mediation problem of the EP exists in a decisive rule of the EU treaties. The EP needs 
more than 50 % of the votes for adopting amendments in the legislative area. None of both big 
political  groups  manages  this  majority.  Also  in  the  sixth  legislative  period,  the  two  groups  are 
dependant on at least three further groups if they do not want to decide as a grand coalition. The 
treaty-based threshold constraints let the EP appear as a closed actor who is not able to transcend 
competing  voter' s  interests  into  the  day-to-day  work.  Both  the  Treaty  constraints  and  the  EP’s 
practice thus provoke a structural competition and communication deficit.  
 
One of the essential challenges for the EP future development follows from this mixed balance of the 
EP’s functions: The search for mobilizing patterns to link the EP with those it claims to represent di-
rectly. Another increase in legislative power will not help to legitimize the increase of the EP’s im-
portance if the processes of interest articulation, interest mediation and interest penetration still run 
exclusively between institutions that can only be perceived as single actors in the abstract. An essen-
tial step to reinforcing linkage between the EP and the citizens could be made through a more open 
and self-confident use of the available conflicts of interests within Parliament as well as within the 
European political parties and other transnational aggregates of the civil society. The EP should start 
to use its potential as an arena and public space in order to assist the construction of transnational 
communication structures.  
 
9. Explaining the European Parliament’s growth 
 
The EP’s agenda in the system-development of the EU has been institutionally expansive - it has 
sought  to  maximise  its  role  in  future  day-to-day  decision-making  configurations.  The  EP’s  own 
preferences about system-development should not, however, be considered in isolation from other 
actors’ priorities. From an intergovernmentalist perspective the democratisation of the EU will occur 
where possible through processes which do not promote the supranationalisation of the EU. Yet if the 
intergovernmentalist perspective questions whether the EP is capable to pursuit its own institutional 
expansion,  whilst  maintaining  that  member  state  governments  promote  supranationalisation  only 
reluctantly,  it  struggles  to  explain  the  current  form  of  “parliamentary  democratisation”  at  the 
European  level.  This  suggests  either  that  Parliament’s  preferences  for  system-development  do 
significantly overlap with those of the other actors involved in treaty change, or that the EP is capable 
of exhibiting a greater degree of leadership than it is given credit for by intergovernmentalists, or 
indeed both together.  
 
From an intergovernmentalist point of view, the evolution of the EU system takes place through the 
short phases of IGCs as “big bargain decisions” (Moravcsik 1993, 473-524; Hurrell/Menon 1996,   16 
386-402; Moravcsik/Nicolaïdis 1999, 59-85). From this perspective, the member states’ governments 
are the dominant actors at the EU level – in daily politics as well as in treaty reform. At IGCs they 
make all the decisions on the reform of the institutional system on the basis of their fixed national 
interests. Supranational institutions have only been established and endowed with powers in order to 
help maximise the governments’ national advantages, e.g. to resolve collective action problems and 
reduce  transaction  costs.  However,  the  institutions  remain  at  all  times  under  the  control  of  the 
member states. They implement the member states’ decisions without having an autonomous reform 
agenda.  
 
According to this analysis, the EP’s material resources and the institutional set-up of ‘grand bargain-
making’ are non-conducive to its playing a strong leadership role, let alone its mobilising coalitions 
around  its  own,  autonomous  preferences.  The  EP  would  be  identified  as  an  actor  able  to  steer 
political debates, to create tension in some parts of the agenda, to make issues public, but it is not a 
decision maker. According to this point of view the influence of the EP is limited, and thus it cannot 
explain the increase in power of the EP.  
 
Yet system and institutional change in the Union do not exclusively take place at IGCs. Relations 
between  Treaty  reform  and  Treaty  implementation  are  not  one-directional,  but  characterized  by 
“mutual  interdependencies  between  and  within  the  many  levels  of  governance  within  the  EU” 
(Sverdrup 2000, 249). Both the EP’s leadership resources and the negotiation context must therefore 
be understood within a broader focus. Neo-institutionalists and structurationists argue that IGCs are 
just  one  step  in  the  constitutional  dynamic.  In  their  broader  vision  of  the  institutional  set-up  of 
constitutional negotiations, the Parliament enjoys an autonomous and formative influence upon the 
agenda of IGCs that is overlooked by intergovernmentalists. 
 
Neo-institutionalist explanations of institutional change of the EU systems challenge the view that 
member states’ governments are the key actors that determine the constitutional development of the 
EU. Neo-institutionalists assert that a plurality of actors participate in the decision-making process. 
They acknowledge the role of autonomously acting supranational institutions that pursue their own 
reform agendas, as well as a dense cluster of governmental and non-governmental actors at all levels 
of the EU. At the core of their arguments is the claim that the scope for action of all these actors is 
defined by the institutions (informal and formal rules, procedures, or norms) in which the policy-
making process is embedded (Pierson, 1998). Moreover, they view institutional change as a process 
unfolding over time. Restricting the analysis of institutional change of the EU to IGCs will only yield 
a snapshot of constitutional development.  
 
Their  model  of  the  ' path-dependency'   of  policy  preferences,  institutions  and  procedures,  policy-
outcomes  and  policy-instruments
  (Pierson,  1998)  suggests  that,  in  such  an  institutionalised 
arrangement like the EC/EU, "past lines of policy [will] condition subsequent policy by encouraging 
societal forces to organise along some lines rather than others, to adapt particular identities or to 
develop  interests  in  policies  that  are  costly  to  shift"  (Hall/Taylor,  1996:  941).  Hence,  every 
introduction of new rules constrains the decision-making options for all actors and the institutional 
change will incrementally develop along certain paths.  
 
Importantly, therefore, this approach allows us to see the EP as an autonomous supranational actor 
with an independent reform agenda. Since its creation, the EP has been able to use the constraints and 
opportunities arising from the mass of decision-making procedures and the multitude of actors in the 
EU’s policy making process to subject more and more policy fields to parliamentary control and 
legislation. This vision of the institutional set-up of constitutional dynamics indicates that the EP has 
been able to exploit the need for leadership in complex bargaining situations in order to pursue its 
own preferences (Maurer/Kietz/Völkel 2005). 
 
Structurationist  approaches  to  the  evolution  of  the  EU  system  (Christiansen/Jørgensen,  1999; 
Christiansen, 1998) come to similar conclusions. Like historical institutionalists they view the EU’s   17 
constitutional development since the very inception of the EC as an unceasing process of incremental 
change with a yet open end. They claim that instead of the member states’ interests, the process of 
treaty reform during which these are constructed must be analysed. Following the notion of path 
dependency, the reform process is structured by pre-defined demands on the IGC, the convergence of 
beliefs about the outcome and the constraints and opportunities established by past choices.  
 
Treaty reforms do not come out of the blue as a “deus ex machina“ from some distant masters, but 
are reactions to prior trends. They “ratify” or “rubberstamp” institutional evolutions which have 
taken place within or outside the existing treaty provisions. They try to address institutional and 
procedural  weaknesses  identified  during  the  implementation  of  previous  provisions  or  aim  at 
adapting the Union to new – external and/or internal – contexts (Christiansen and Jørgensen, 1999).  
 
System-development takes place through incrementalism in a ‘valley’ of day-to-day politics. The 
resulting, incremental change suggests that treaty reform is subject to a wide range of actors (not only 
states) and to an unceasing process of discovering political preferences and “problem solving” in an 
unstable setting (Risse-Kappen 1996, 53-80). Member States identify their preferences not simply as 
a fixed set of demands, but also during the process of Treaty implementation and Treaty reform. The 
EP can then be located as an important actor able to influence the rolling agenda of the very process 
of system-development. 
 
IIAs  are  instrumental  in  gradually  strengthening  the  EP.  IIAs  do  not  simply  implement  Treaty 
provisions or lay down practical rules of cooperation. They provide the EP with powers not foreseen 
in the EU Treaties. And in some cases they provide the basis for future Treaty reform. 
 
The analysis of the evolution of the EP’s rights in comitology, legislative planning and in holding the 
Commission to account (Kietz/Maurer 2007) provides strong evidence. First, there is clear evidence 
that the EP uses its formal bargaining powers (stemming from the possibility to delay and reject 
legislation, appoint and censure the Commission and its budgetary rights) to wrest concessions from 
the other two main players in decision-making. In line with previous research
6 we find that the 
common perception of interinstitutional conflict is the precondition for the conclusion of IIAs which 
provide the EP with additional powers not foreseen in the Treaties. In the case of comitology this was 
the result of situations of legislative gridlock under co-decision and was often reinforced by the 
freezing of comitology funds, for example in the case of Modus Vivendi or the most recent agreement 
on comitology. The slow but gradual increase in the EP’s influence in comitology is a clear function 
of its increased power in decision-making. For the other two areas – legislative planning and IIAs 
governing the relationships between Commission and EP – the reason for conflict stemmed from the 
EP’s increased power to hold the Commission accountable. In all three case studies the reason for the 
Council and the Commission to enter IIAs with the EP was the necessity to end or at least ease the 
situation of interinstitutional conflict. In general terms, the period between the first rejection of a 
legislative  proposal  under  the  co-decision  procedure  in  1994  and  the  demission  of  the  Santer 
Commission  in  1999  proved  crucial  in  the  strengthening  of  the  EP’s  bargaining  power.  In  the 
negotiations of the framework agreement in 2000 and 2005 or when the EP pressed for amendments 
to the Comitology Decision, the EP was in a completely different negotiation position than at the end 
of the 1980s - its bargaining potential had largely increased.  
 
There is also evidence for our second argument: In line with historical institutionalist explanations of 
constitutional change in the EU, IIAs can be instrumental in Treaty reform. There is strong evidence 
for path dependency in IIAs, for example, all four consecutive IIAs governing the Commission-EP 
relations build up on each other and each takes the EP’s competencies a step further. The case is even 
stronger  for  comitology,  where  IIAs  and  the  reform  of  secondary  law,  i.e.  of  the  Comitology 
Decisions, are strongly linked.  
                                                 
6   Monar, ‘Interinstitutional Agreements’, n 2 above; Maurer, Kietz and Völkel, ‘Interinstitutional Agreements in the CFSP’ n 24 
above.   18 
 
However, although we can show evidence for informal and incremental institutional ‘development’
7 
or ‘sub-constitutional change’, assumptions on the gradual formalisation of informal practises laid 
down  in  IIAs,  i.e.  their  codification  in  secondary  and  primary  law,  only  hold  for  the  case  of 
comitology.  Only  in  comitology  were  the  powers  handed  over  to  the  EP  in  the  informal  arena 
through IIAs also codified in secondary law (and will lead to Treaty amendments if the DCT is 
adopted). One explanation is that comitology is arguably the most crucial area for the EP’s agenda in 
legislative politics. It is the only area where the Treaties advantaged the Council over the EP by 
codifying  the  right  to  delegate  and  scrutinise  the  implementation  of  legislation  which  severely 
interfered with the EP’s power to co-legislate. Thus, the EP pursued a very consistent long term 
strategy of being placed on equal footing with the Council in the delegation and scrutiny of the 
implementation of legislation. 
 
System-development  appears  to  be  the  most  laborious  function  of  the  EP,  considering  that  the 
Parliament  has  to  improve  both  its  situation  within  the  institutional  framework  and  advance  the 
community’s policies. System-development proves to function à longue durée. The EP still has to 
make use of its strategy of small steps and compromises with powerful partners. These compromises 
are, however, based on thin ice. A position of the EP, which is too inflexible and rigid, could obstruct 
further improvements. An attitude too weak, however, could prevent far-reaching solutions. To date, 
the  European  Parliament  has  not,  used  this  possibility  against  major  reforms  or  constitutional 
decisions, but rather showed a constructive attitude (Wessels 1996, 893).  
 
The Parliament is capable of displaying a greater degree of leadership than it is given credit for by 
intergovernmentalists. Although the EP remains formally marginalised in the actual IGC processes, 
the process of constitutional reform must be viewed through a broader lens that takes into account 
both the ‘summits’ and ‘valleys’ of European integration. Exploiting its growing powers in day-to-
day policy-making, the Parliament has employed system-developing strategies in order to improve 
resources it enjoys in negotiations, as well as to render the context of constitutional negotiations more 
favourable from its point of view.  
 
Given the dynamic nature of the EU’s institutional structure it is unsurprising that the EP’s system-
development strategy has developed over time. The mutually beneficial relationship between the 
Parliament’s resources in daily policy-making and those it enjoys in constitutional negotiations has 
permitted the EP to play a greater role in those negotiations. This has allowed it to turn its previously 
rather passive ideational role in constitutional negotiations into an active one. Similarly, its growing 
capacity  to  sanction  and  reward  member  states  through  its  behaviour  outside  constitutional 
negotiations has allowed it to play a more active structural leadership role.  
 
Conversely, the growth in its material resources and its capacity to play a decisive role in system-
development appear in some respects to have actually reduced the Parliament’s scope to pursue its 
own, traditional preferences. In the public perception, MEPs are no longer democratic opponents of 
„EU bureaucracy“ but a part of the European political “establishment”. Has this gradual strategy of 
participation through gaining power turned the EP from a potential troublemaker into a tame partner? 
One thing is clear: Without personalising itself or defining its profile vis a vis the national actors - 
without establishing itself as an independent, political and politisized actor - it is hard to make the 
EP’s role clear to citizens. By following a strategy of ‚containment‘ towards the Commission and 
Council, the EP’s capacity to act increasingly resembles that of national parliamentary majorities, 
which have lost their profile vis a vis the governments which they have elected, except in crisis 
situations. 
  
                                                 
7   P. Pierson, ‘Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes’, (2000) Studies in American Political Develop-
ment 14, 72-92.   19 
Nevertheless - and although the extension of the EP’s powers through the DCT was not one of the 
prime points of controversy during the ratification process – the more general question arises of 
whether the growth of the EP in the elaboration of the DCT contributed to the subsequent ratification 
crisis. The Parliament arguably exaggerated its material resources (legitimising function) in pushing 
for  the  Convention  and  slackened  the  principal-agent  relationship  with  its  electorate  in  the 
negotiations themselves. Whether the Parliament will turn out to have been a victim of its own 
success  in  mobilising  coalitions  around  its  own  preferences  in  this  round  of  constitutional 
negotiations, remains to be seen. 
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1   Of the 348 approved acts, 236 cases were reached without convening the Conciliation committee out of which 157 were 
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and joint compromise texts of both the Parliament and the Council. 
2   The transit regime of the EC is a system whereby goods coming into the EC are exempted from tax until they reach their 
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